The beef hormone case is the first SPS measure case applied since the establishment of WTO system, and provides valuable interpretation of some vague definitions in the Agreement such as scope of SPS Agreement, burden of proof, role of international organizations and their influences, requisite procedure for a member country to adopt stricter criteria than international criteria, determination of appropriate level of protection etc. This case left some lessons to the ensuing cases, Canada vs. Australia-Salmon case, US vs. Japan-Agricultural Products case, US vs. Japan-Apples case, and Argentina, Canada, US vs. EC-Biotech Products ("GMO").
First, while the SPS measures shall be "based on" the existing international standards, the "based on" criteria does not mean "conform to". The ordinary meaning of "based on" is quite different form the plain or natural import of "conform to". The Appellate Body said that a measure that "conform to" and incorporates a Codex standard is "based on" that standard. A measure, however, based on the same standard might not conform to that standard, as where only some, not all, of the elements of the standard are incorporated into the measure.
Second, the paragraphs of Art. 3 of SPS are separate and are not general-exception nexus to each other. The right of a Member to establish its own level of sanitary protection under Article 3.3 of the SPS Ageement is an autonomous right and not an "exception" from a "general obligation" under Article 3.1.
Third, an SPS measure should be sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted by the risk assessment which should not be required to establish a quantitative minimum magnitude of risk.
Fourth, The objective of Article 5.5 is formulated as the "achieving of consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection", and avoiding only arbitrary or unjustifiable inconsistencies.
Fifth, science can never provide absolute certainty that a given substance will not ever have adverse health effects, which can not be the kind of risk to be assessed under Article 5.1.
Sixth, the difference in the levels of protection that is characterizable as arbitrary or unjustifiable is only an element of proof that a Member may actually be applying an SPS measure in a manner that discriminates between Members or constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade. The answer to the question whether arbitrary or unjustifiable differences or distinctions in levels of protection established by a Member do in fact result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade must be sought in the circumstances of each individual case.