Title Page
Abstract
Contents
Glossary 14
Chapter 1. Introduction 15
1.1. Backgrounds and research objective 15
1.2. Research outline 18
Chapter 2. Knowledge spillovers and innovation performance of the originator: The moderating effect of technological alliances 25
2.1. Introduction 25
2.2. Theoretical framework 29
2.3. Hypotheses 34
2.3.1. Technological diversity of the SKP and innovation 34
2.3.2. Technological overlap of the SKP and innovation 36
2.3.3. Moderating effects of technological alliances 38
2.3.4. Technological alliance and technological diversity of the SKP 39
2.3.5. Technological alliance and technological overlap of the SKP 41
2.4. Methods 43
2.4.1. Data and sample 43
2.4.2. Variables 47
2.4.3. Empirical model 57
2.5. Results 58
2.5.1. Robustness test 66
2.6. Discussion and conclusion 72
2.6.1. Theoretical contributions 72
2.6.2. Practical implications 74
2.6.3. Limitations and future research 76
Chapter 3. Invigorating PDA technology transfers: The impacts of informal appropriability mechanisms and opportunistic intentions 82
3.1. Introduction 82
3.2. Theory and hypothesis 86
3.2.1. Informal appropriability mechanisms 86
3.2.2. Knowledge leakage risks and the opportunistic intentions of third parties 88
3.2.3. The provider's perception of misappropriation risks and endowment effects 91
3.2.4. The strength of informal appropriability mechanisms and opportunistic intentions 94
3.3. Methodology 96
3.3.1. The model 98
3.4. Simulation model (Extension of SKIN model) 106
3.4.1. The attributes and behaviors 106
3.4.2. Agent architecture 109
3.5. Simulations and parameters 123
3.5.1. Parameters and experiments 123
3.5.2. Results 128
3.6. Conclusion 135
3.6.1. Theoretical contribution 136
3.6.2. Policy and managerial implications 138
3.6.3. Limitation and future research 141
Chapter 4. Conclusion 142
Bibliography 146
Appendices 171
Appendix 1. Appendix of Chapter 2 171
Appendix 2. Appendix of Chapter 3 175
Abstract (Korean) 192
Table 1-1. Research Overview 23
Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 59
Table 2-2. Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood regression results 62
Table 3-1. Key attributes of the agent and environment 107
Table 3-2. Stylized facts as design and validation criteria 109
Table 3-3. Parameter setting 125
Table 3-4. Experiment settings 126
Table A-1. The Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood regression results 171
Table B-1. Experiments varying Informal appropriability regime of developing countries 177
Table B-2. Experiments varying Opportunistic intention (β) 177
Table B-3. Additional experiments varying Opportunistic intention (β) 178
Figure 1-1. Research outline 24
Figure 2-1. Conceptual diagram of Chapter 2 42
Figure 2-2. The composition of SKP and the observation time period 49
Figure 2-3. Marginal effects of Technological diversity of SKP on innovation performance, conditional on Technological alliance 63
Figure 2-4. Marginal effects of Technological overlap of SKP on innovation performance, conditional on Technological alliance 65
Figure 3-1. Kene 99
Figure 3-2. Kene and Innovation Hypothesis (IH) 100
Figure 3-3. Evaluation of IH and the success threshold of IH 101
Figure 3-4. Deformation of the reward landscape after the reward is given to the IH(s) which exceed success threshold 102
Figure 3-5. The diagram of complex adaptive system of the simulation model 108
Figure 3-6. The categorization of knowledge elements - explicit and tacit 110
Figure 3-7. The link among the explicit and tacit knowledge elements 111
Figure 3-8. The effects of the strength of developing countries' informal appropriability regime 128
Figure 3-9. The effects of the level of opportunistic intention on the quantity and quality of PDA technology transfers 130
Figure 3-10. The combined effects of the level of opportunistic intention and the endowment effects on the quantity of PDA technology transfers 132
Figure 3-11. The combined effects of the level of opportunistic intention and the endowment effects on the quality of PDA technology transfers 133
Figure 3-12. The combined effects of the level of opportunistic intention and the strength of informal appropriability regime on the quantity of PDA technology transfers 134
Figure 3-13. The combined effects of the level of opportunistic intention and the strength of informal appropriability regime on the quality of PDA technology transfers 135
Figure 4-1. Conceptual framework of the dissertation: Virtuous cycle of private sector's knowledge disclosure and the appropriability 145
Figure A-1. Marginal effects of Technological diversity of SKP on innovation performance, conditional on Technological alliance (Alternative measure of Technological diversity of SKP) 173
Figure A-2. Marginal effects of Technological overlap of SKP on innovation performance, conditional on Technological alliance (Alternative measure of Technological diversity of SKP) 173
Figure A-3. Marginal effects of Technological diversity of SKP on innovation performance, conditional on Technological alliance (Alternative measure of Technological alliance) 174
Figure A-4. Marginal effects of Technological overlap of SKP on innovation performance, conditional on Technological alliance (Alternative measure of Technological alliance) 174
Figure B-1. The effects of the opportunistic intention on the knowledge leakage 178
Figure C-1. The sensitivity tests of Hypotheses varying the Number of firms (N=650, 700) 181
Figure C-2. The sensitivity tests of Hypothesis 2 and 3 with extreme values of Opportunistic intention (0.1, 0.9) 182
Figure C-3. The sensitivity tests of Hypothesis 2 with extreme values of Endowment effects (0.05, 0.95) 183
Figure C-4. The sensitivity tests of Hypotheses by adopting different value of Update parameter of negative experience(ϴ-=0.5) 185
Figure D-1. Additional analyses for H1 (a) with alternative additional attractiveness mechanism and the tax credit for the collaboration tax (ρ=0.005, 𝜅=0.0001) 188
Figure D-2. Additional analyses for H1 (b) with alternative additional attractiveness mechanism and the tax credit for the collaboration tax (ρ=0.005, 𝜅=0.0001) 189
Figure D-3. Additional analyses for H2 with alternative additional attractiveness mechanism and the tax credit for the collaboration tax (ρ=0.005, 𝜅=0.0001) 190
Figure D-4. Additional analyses for H3 with alternative additional attractiveness mechanism and the tax credit for the collaboration tax (ρ=0.005, 𝜅=0.0001) 191