Starting from the fundamental inquiry into whether the tradition of underestimating logistics is inherent in the Japanese army, this dissertation thoroughly investigates the introduction and conceptualization of military logistics by the modern Japanese army. It examines the institutionalization of logistics through the enactment of laws, the management of logistics during the first Sino-Japanese War, and the subsequent reorganization of logistics following the conclusion of the conflict. Diverging from previous studies that predominantly explored specific aspects such as transportation, communications, or sanitation within military logistics, this research provides a comprehensive analysis of the system's functioning, highlighting its integral role as a singular, comprehensive, and intricate supply system located at the rear.
The modern concept of military logistics was first introduced by Kelmens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel, an esteemed instructor who was invited to the army war college in 1885. At that time, the Japanese army operated under the Chindai(鎮台) system, primarily focused on defending the mainland. However, even the elite generals, comprising the top 10% of the army, struggled to grasp the intricacies of logistics for field armies deployed overseas. Meckel commenced his instruction by elucidating basic terminology, encompassing the transportation of divisions within logistics, the integration of combat arms, and the overarching concept of maintaining a continuous supply chain from the rear to the front lines.
Meckel's educational approach aimed to instill a solid understanding of the foundational principles behind establishing a supply line and executing logistics operations and commands. To facilitate this, a series of field education programs called 'the trip for staff practice'(参謀練習旅行) were conducted, where Meckel provided problem-solving scenarios and engaged in discussions with third-grade students at the Army war college and agents of the imperial Japanese army general staff office(参謀本部). Over the course of three years, these field education sessions were held seven times. Through this immersive learning experience, the elite generals gained proficiency in the essential concepts of logistics operations, command structures, and the establishment of supply lines. These newfound understandings served as the bedrock for the subsequent institutionalization of military logistics through the implementation of ordinances.
After Meckel's departure from Japan, the Japanese army underwent a transformation into the modern divisional system. In preparation for the impending warfare with the Qing, the army established ordinances and manuals specifically tailored to the logistics system. Between 1887 and June 6th, 1894, as the dispatch to Joseon loomed, the Japanese army diligently organized institutions and developed comprehensive ordinances for logistics.
Through an examination of various statute books, it becomes evident that the logistics system encompassed a vast structure, comprising multiple specialized fields such as transportation, communications, sanitation, and accountancy. The organization and mobilization department(兵站総監部) operated under the imperial general headquarters(大本営), while the logistics unit(兵站部) was affiliated with the independent field division at the center. Within the organization and mobilization department, there existed sub-organizations including the quartermaster general (兵站監), the transportation and communications general(運輸通信長官), the field army director general(野戦監督長官), and the field sanitation general(野戦衛生長官).
Nevertheless, the logistics organization functioned within distinct spatial domains categorized as dot, line, and area, such as the "main logistics field"(兵站主地), "logistics field"(兵站地), "supply line"(兵站線路), and "logistics management area"(兵站管理区域).
The Japanese army, despite lacking prior experience in overseas warfare, successfully established a robust and efficient logistics system characterized by a well-regulated commanding structure, defined tasks, and control areas. This achievement was made possible through the direct adoption of German logistics systems, which had already demonstrated their effectiveness in various military campaigns. However, it is worth noting that Meckel's education, which primarily relied on German standards, did not encompass the intricacies of maritime supply lines and logistics management in foreign territories. Consequently, the logistics system implemented by the Japanese military can be considered a "pay-later" approach, as it had not undergone the trial and error process typical of real-world scenarios.
In order to comprehensively examine the logistics system developed by the Japanese army without prior overseas warfare experience, this dissertation focuses specifically on the Korean peninsula. The study traces the supply lines originating from the port cities of Incheon, Busan, and Wonsan, where the Japanese army conducted its landings. Through this analysis, the supply lines are classified into two categories: "passing" supply lines('通過型' 兵站線) and "operations support" supply lines('作戰支援型' 兵站線) on land, as well as "maritime supply lines"(海路兵站線) and "watercourse supply lines"(水路兵站線) on water. It was not uncommon for overland supply lines to be supplemented by maritime or watercourse routes.
The transportation capacity of support lines varied in order, with marine transport, watercourse transport, carts, draught horses, and manual laborers. Consequently, the logistics unit(兵站部) of the Japanese army favored maritime or watercourse supply lines due to their larger transport capacity. However, the maritime supply lines, which boasted the highest transportation capacity, were burdened by a significant challenge-securing control of the sea. Without absolute dominance over the seas, these maritime supply lines could not be utilized without the protection of battleships.
What ultimately determined the successful functioning of the logistics system during the first Sino-Japanese war was not solely effective command structures, but rather the indispensable reliance on a labor-intensive workforce comprising workers and shaft horses. Mechanized power played no role in the operations, leaving the Japanese army with no choice but to heavily depend on human and animal labor. However, the 9th Mixed Brigade(混成第九旅団), positioned at the forefront, encountered significant challenges in procuring an adequate number of workers and shaft horses along the newly established Incheon-Yongsan supply line. Consequently, the breakdown of labor columns became prevalent due to frequent desertions. These difficulties were further exacerbated by the imperial general headquarters' steadfast adherence to the policy of "local procurement".
Recognizing the challenges posed by frequent desertions of workers, shaft horses, and cows, the leadership of the Japanese army gradually shifted their focus towards the implementation of a light railway system as a viable solution for mass transportation. This strategic shift aimed to alleviate the logistical paralysis caused by the reliance on traditional labor-intensive methods. Evidence supporting this change in mindset can be observed in the Japanese army's attempts to employ a light railway during the planned Zhili Operation(直隸作戦), which encompassed the region from Shanhaiguan to Beijing. Although the logistics plan involving the light railway could not be realized due to the signing of a peace treaty, it laid the groundwork for the establishment of a railway battalion. Notwithstanding ongoing peace negotiations, the Japanese army demonstrated unwavering determination to conquer Beijing by organizing temporary railway troops and enacting relevant ordinances.
Through an examination of the concerns raised by logistics officers and the subsequent reorganization of logistics ordinances, we can ascertain that the army's senior members, faced with the challenges of operating long-distance supply lines and severe manpower shortages, considered the length of supply lines and the recruitment of logistics personnel as critical factors in logistics operations. This viewpoint is supported by the repeated emphasis on the need to increase logistics personnel evident in various written opinions. Furthermore, efforts were made to establish a pool of human resources for recruiting commanders of the quartermaster unit(兵站監部) during peacetime. Additionally, revisions to the ordinances were undertaken with the aim of reducing the distance between logistics commands(兵站司令部) and expanding logistics columns. The inclusion of an increased number of logistics personnel in the revised ordinances can be attributed to the existing consensus among the army's leadership on this matter. However, not all logistics challenges were completely resolved, and certain tasks remained unresolved. One such example is the changing perception regarding the concept of "local procurement".