Title Page
ABSTRACT
Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction 10
1.1. Background 10
2.1. Study Purpose and Methodology Scope 12
3.1. Structure of this dissertation 14
Chapter 2. The summarization of the subsidy rules 16
2.1. The definition of the subsidy 16
2.2. The classification of subsidy 20
2.2.1. Export subsidy and domestic subsidy 20
2.2.2. Actionable-subsidy 23
Chapter 3. Dispute settlement mechanism of subsidies and countervailing measures 27
3.1. Entity study of dispute settlement mechanism 27
3.1.1. Identification of the existence of subsidies 28
3.1.2. Difference between prohibited subsidy and actionable subsidy 39
3.2. Procedural study of dispute settlement mechanism 41
3.2.1. Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 42
3.2.2. Domestic dispute settlement mechanism 48
Chapter 4. Analysis of Chinese subsidy situation by other countries 54
4.1. The reason of anti-subsidy by other countries 56
4.2. Situation of countervailing from the United States 59
4.2.1. The United States amends the countervailing law against China 59
4.2.2. The Practice of the US Countervailing Investigation against China and China's Response 61
4.3. Situation of countervailing from European Union 64
4.4. Situation of countervailing from Canada 65
Chapter 5. Analysis of China's response against anti-subsidy 70
5.1. Status quo and how to handle it 70
5.1.1. Dealing with prohibited subsidy 71
5.1.2. Dealing with actionable subsidy 78
5.1.3. Dealing with non-actionable subsidy 85
5.2. The legislation and improvement of China's countervailing issues 92
5.2.1. The legislation of China's countervailing issues 92
5.2.2. Improvement of China's countervailing issues 98
5.3. Analysis of the countermeasures China should take 110
5.3.1. Government, enterprises and industry associations should fully play their roles and cooperate closely 110
5.3.2. Familiar and flexible use of DSB dispute resolution mechanism 113
5.3.3. Establish a legal mechanism that can cope with international countervailing lawsuits 115
5.3.4. Actively participate in the reform and improvement of the SCM Agreement 116
Chapter 6. conclusion 120
REFERENCES 124