Being considered as the greatest achievement since the end of the World War II, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade system, and later is the World Trade Organization, has significantly contributed to the common development of the contracting members, especially the under-developed countries. Particularly speaking, there are much efforts and determination by which the negotiating parties have put forth many years ago to create more chance and, at the same time, reduce impediment within the multilateral trading relation. One of such works is the process that has led to the unanimous agreement called Differential and more favorable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries, with another well-known name of the Enabling Clause. Under this instrument, a permanent program which provides "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" preferences has been activated and functioned in an influential task of fostering the economic growth and competitive level of the developing members. During four decades practicing, the GSP schemes have brought out many problems and unsettled questions needed further researches for a more proper understanding and implementation.
This dissertation explores the matters raised in the GSP programs granted by the developed countries by firstly studying the tribunal's decision of the EC – Tariff preferences case, the one has been reported to be the only case being resolved under the Enabling Clause. Also, this dissertation will include legal analysis of GSP mechanism and some relevant issues. From there this dissertation hopes to examine whether the GSP programs have fulfilled the ambition and objective of the instrument in supporting the weaker contracting members, then to present a pack of suggested understanding so that we can effectively utilize this system.